We can approach category theory externally in which case we would ask questions about the status of any system of categories. So, for instance, we could ask whether any system of categories must exhibit some kind of dependency on the mind, language, conceptual schemes, or whatever.
Realists will answer this question in the negative, and idealists of one stripe or another in the affirmative. In addition, we can ask about our epistemic access to the ultimate categories in the world. And we can adopt positions ranging from a radical skepticism about our access to categories to a kind of infallibilism about such access.
If, on the other hand, we approach category theory from an internal perspective, we will assume some answer to the external questions and then go on to ask about the correctness of the system of categories under those assumptions.
So, for instance, we might adopt a realist perspective and hence assume that there is some correct metaphysically privileged list of mind and language independent highest kinds as well as a correct account of the relations between them. And we can then try to determine what that list is. Now, Aristotle certainly belongs to this latter tradition of speculation about categories: he assumes rather than defends a posture of realism with respect to the metaphysical structures in the world.
It is thus appropriate to assume realism along with him and then inquire into the question of which categories there might be. One way of approaching this question is to ask whether there is some principled procedure by which Aristotle generated his list of categories. For, if there is, then one could presumably assess his list of highest kinds by assessing the procedure by which he generated it. Unfortunately, with the exception of some suggestive remarks in the Topics , Aristotle does not indicate how he generated his scheme.
And as a matter of historical fact, the lack of any justification for his list of highest kinds has been the source of some famous criticisms. Kant, for instance, just prior to the articulation of his own categorial scheme, says:. Hence, it cannot stand firm as a correct set of categories. As it turns out, although Kant did not know of any procedure by which Aristotle might have generated his list of categories, scholars have given a number of proposals. Ackrill is the most prominent defender of the Question Approach.
Ackrill claims that there are two different ways to generate the categories, each of which involves asking questions. According to the first method, we are to ask a single question — what is it? So, for instance, we can ask of Socrates, what is Socrates? And we can answer — Socrates is a human. We can then direct the same question to the answer we have given: what is a human?
And we can answer: a human is an animal. Eventually, this process of question asking will lead us to some highest kind, in this case, Substance. According to the second method of questioning, we are to ask as many different questions as we can about a single primary substance.
So, for instance, we might ask — how tall is Socrates? Where is Socrates? What is Socrates? And in answering these questions, we will respond five feet, in the Agora, Human. We will then realize that our answers to our various questions group into ten irreducible kinds. But from a philosophical point of view, the question method suffers from some serious problems. Suppose, for instance, I employ the second method and ask: does Socrates like Plato?
But where does that answer belong in the categorical scheme? But we can still ask the question: is Socrates present-in or not present-in something else? It is indeed hard to see. Similar problems face the first method. Of course, particulars are part of the four-fold system of classification that Aristotle articulates.
But we are not at the moment concerned with that scheme. Indeed, to advert to that scheme in the present context is simply to re-open the question of the relations between the two main systems of classification in the Categories. Unless we can be confident that our questions are tracking the metaphysical structures of the world, we should be unimpressed by the fact that they yield any set of categories.
But to know whether our questions are tracking the metaphysical structures of the world requires us to have some way of establishing the correctness of the categorial scheme. Clearly, at this point, we are in a circle that is too small to be of much help. Maybe all metaphysical theorizing is at some level laden with circularity, but circles this small are generally unacceptable to a metaphysician.
According to the grammatical approach, which traces to Trendelenburg and has most recently been defended by Michael Baumer , Aristotle generated his list by paying attention to the structures inherent in language. On the assumption that the metaphysical structure of the world mirrors the structures in language, we should be able to find the basic metaphysical structures by examining our language.
This approach is quite involved but for our purposes can be illustrated with a few examples. The distinction between substance and the rest of the categories, for instance, is built into the subject-predicate structure of our language. Consider, for instance, the two sentences: 1 Socrates is a human; and 2 Socrates is white. Corresponding to that subject, one might think, is an entity of some kind, namely a primary substance.
Moreover, the first sentence contains what might be called an individuating predicate — it is a predicate of the form, a such and such, rather than of the form, such and such. So, one might think, there are predicates that attribute to primary substances properties the having of which suffices for that substance to be an individual of some kind. On the other hand, the second sentence contains a non-individuating predicate.
So by examining the details of the predicates in our language, we have some grounds for distinguishing between the category of substance and the accidental categories. The grammatical approach certainly does have some virtues.
First, we have ample evidence that Aristotle was sensitive to language and the structures inherent in it. So it would not be all that surprising were he led by his sensitivity to linguistic structures to his list of categories. Moreover, some of the peculiarities of his list are nicely explained in this way. Two of the highest kinds are action and passion. In Physics III 3, however, Aristotle argues that in the world there is only motion and that the distinction between action and passion lies in the way in which one is considering the motion.
So why should there be two distinct categories, namely action, and passion, rather than just one, namely motion? Well, the grammatical approach offers an explanation: in language, we differentiate between active and passive verbs. Hence, there are two distinct categories, not just one.
Despite these virtues, the grammatical approach faces a difficult question: why think that the structures we find in language reflect the metaphysical structures of the world? For instance, it may simply be a historical accident that our language contains individuating and non-individuating predicates.
Likewise, it may be a historical accident that there are active and passive verbs in our language. Of course, this type of objection, when pushed to its limits, leads to one of the more difficult philosophical questions, namely how can we be sure that the structures of our representations are in any way related to what some might call the basic metaphysical structures and to what others might call the things in themselves? But one might hold out hope that some justification for a categorial scheme could be given that did not rest entirely on the unjustified assertion of some deep correspondence between linguistic and metaphysical structures.
The Modal Approach, which traces to Bonitz and has most recently been defended by Julius Moravscik , avoids the defects of both the previous two approaches. As Moravscik formulates this view, the categories are those types of entities to which any sensible particular must be related. He says:. In virtue of its explicitly modal nature, the Modal Approach avoids the defects of the previous two approaches.
Whereas the first two approaches ultimately rely on some connection between metaphysical structures and what appear to be merely contingent features of either our question asking proclivities or the structures inherent in our language, the Modal Approach eliminates contingency altogether. Despite its explicitly modal character, the Modal Approach does face a difficulty similar to the one faced by the Question Approach.
So, for instance, every material particular must be related to a particular. But there is no category of particulars. There are, of course, beings that are not said-of other beings. Moreover, must not every material particular be related to matter? But matter is not a highest kind. Indeed, it is far from clear where matter belongs in the categories. This problem could of course be alleviated somewhat if instead of merely appealing to modal structures as such, one could appeal to modal structures that arguably Aristotle would have thought are part of the very fabric of the world.
The following quotation from Brentano captures nicely the philosophical import of such derivations. This passage illustrates the tenor of the Medieval derivational approach. There are two such ways: 1 essentially and absolutely; or 2 essentially and not absolutely but with reference to something else. The latter way corresponds to the category of relatives; the former, to the categories of quality and quantity. Aquinas then divides the former way of being in a subject in terms of form and matter.
He claims, strikingly, that the category of quality flows from form and that the category of quantity flows from matter. By invoking a combination of a priori sounding semantic principles and theses about the relationship between form and quality and matter and quantity, Aquinas has gone some way toward doing this. Aristotle is certainly committed to the claim that form and matter are two of the absolutely fundamental aspects of the material world.
Indeed, he argues in the Physics that form and matter are necessary for the existence of motion, which, he thinks, essentially characterizes bodies. Moreover, the Medieval interpretations face the charge that they are an over-interpretation of Aristotle. Aristotle simply does not provide in his surviving writings the sort of conceptual connections that underlie the Medieval derivations.
Indeed, from a twentieth-century perspective, the Medieval derivations look very strange. It is commonplace in contemporary Aristotle scholarship to view the Categories as an early work and to think that Aristotle had not developed his theory of form and matter until later in his career.
If this general approach is correct, the claim that the categorial scheme can somehow be derived at least in part from form and matter appears implausible. Minimally, the task is a daunting one. Indeed, it should not be at all surprising that the difficulties that have beset metaphysical speculation in the Western tradition can be seen in such a stark and provocative fashion in one of the great founding works of that very tradition. In fact, it is in part due to such difficulties that external questions about categorial and other metaphysical structures arise.
Such difficulties understandably lead to questions about the legitimacy of category theory and metaphysical speculation in general. Unfortunately, the history of metaphysical speculation has shown that it is no less difficult to establish answers to external than to internal questions about category theory. Two trends in recent philosophical scholarship are of special note. The first considers it directly, as a topic of investigation in its own right; see Shields ed.
In Shields ed. The ontology of the Categories is examined with a critical lens sharpened by a number of contemporary debates Loux a. Haaparanta and Koskinen eds. Many commentators have thought such a thesis to be deeply problematic. Loux agrees in part with such a sentiment, arguing that the thesis makes univocal but transcategorial reference impossible, thereby rendering a statement of the thesis that being is said in many ways impossible as well. Loux, however, finds a way to salvage the Aristotelian thesis by denying the claim that it is about the meaning or sense of universal terms.
The volume continues with discussions that become increasingly remote in time but which therefore show the lasting influence of his categorialism. And by the latter part of the volume, the essays begin to focus on other philosophers, e.
Aristotle Aristotle, General Topics: metaphysics substance. The Four-Fold Division 1. The Ten-Fold Division 2. Whence the Categories? The Four-Fold Division The Categories divides naturally into three distinct parts — what have come to be known as the Pre-Predicamenta chs.
The interested reader can find a discussion of these issues here: Supplement on Nonsubstantial Particulars for Aristotle Metaphysics 2. Studtman A number of other questions about Quantity could be asked. Aristotle divides quality as follows 8b26—10a11 : Quality Habits and Dispositions Natural Capabilities and Incapabilities Affective Qualities and Affections Shape Each of these species looks like an extra-linguistic type of entity, and none of the species appears to be a species in another category.
Ackrill, for instance, criticizes Aristotle as follows: He [Aristotle] gives no special argument to show that [habits and dispositions] are qualities. Nor does he give any criterion for deciding that a given quality is or is not a [habit-or-disposition]; why, for example, should affective qualities be treated as a class quite distinct from [habits and dispositions]?
Aquinas, for instance, says the following about the category in his Summa Theologiae : Now the mode of determination of the subject to accidental being may be taken in regard to the very nature of the subject, or in regard to action, and passion resulting from its natural principles, which are matter and form; or again in regard to quantity.
Kant, for instance, just prior to the articulation of his own categorial scheme, says: It was an enterprise worthy of an acute thinker like Aristotle to try to discover these fundamental concepts; but as he had no guiding principle he merely picked them up as they occurred to him, and at first gathered up ten of them, which he called categories or predicaments.
Afterwards he thought he had discovered five more of them, which he added under the name of post-predicaments. He says: According to this interpretation the constitutive principle of the list of categories is that they constitute those classes of items to each of which any sensible particular — substantial or otherwise — must be related.
Any sensible particular, substance, event, sound, etc. On the contrary, it seems to me that there is no doubt that Aristotle could have arrived at a certain a priori proof, a deductive argument for the completeness of the distinction of categories … On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle , Ch. A predicate is referred to a subject in a second way when the predicate is taken as being in the subject, and this predicate is in the subject either essentially and absolutely and as something flowing from its matter, and then it is quantity; or as something flowing from its form, and then it is quality; or it is not present in the subject absolutely but with reference to something else, and then it is relation.
Recent Work Two trends in recent philosophical scholarship are of special note. Bibliography Ackrill, J. Allen, R. Alwishah, Ahmed, and Hayes, Josh eds. On Aristotle Categories , S. Cohen and G. Matthews, trans. Annas, J. Aquinas, Thomas. Rowan, trans. Treatise on the Virtues , John A. Oesterle trans. Brentano, Franz. George trans. Baumer, Michael, Bonitz, J. Code, Alan, Bogen and J.
McGuire eds. Cresswell, M. Dancy, R. Devereux, Daniel T. De Vogel, C. On Aristotle Categories , John Dillon trans. Driscoll, J. Duerlinger, J. Edelhoff, A. Engmann, J. Ferejohn, M. Furth, Montgomery, Graham, D. Granger, H. Griffin, M. Haaparanta, Leila, and Heikki J. Koskinen eds. Heinaman, R. Irwin, T. Jones, B. Kahm, Nick, Kemp Smith trans. Knuttilla, S. Kukkonen, T. Loux, M. Matthews, Gareth B. Kelly and Hans Josef Niederhe eds. Moravcsik, J. Normore, C. Owen, G. Bambrough ed.
Owens, Joseph. Strange, trans. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, Indianapolis: Hackett, Ross, David. Schofield M. Schofield, M. Sorabji eds. Shields, Christopher ed. Gaskin trans. Fleet trans. Chase trans. Stough, C.
Studtmann, P. Thorp, J. Trendelenburg, Adolf, Geschichte der Kategorienlehre , Berlin: Verlag von G. Tuominem, M, Wedin, Michael V. Academic Tools How to cite this entry. Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database. Open access to the SEP is made possible by a world-wide funding initiative. Mirror Sites View this site from another server:.
Ackrill, J. Google Scholar. Storrs McCall Oxford: Clarendon, , — CrossRef Google Scholar. Smeaton London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Cooke, Harold P. De Rijk, Lambertus M. Gillespie, C. Gomperz, Theodor: , Greek Thinkers , vol. Berry London: Murray. Husserl, Edmund: , Logische Untersuchungen , 2 vols, in three parts 2nd ed. Kahn, Charles H. Owen Oxford: Clarendon , — Montague, Richard: , Formal Philosophy. Selected Papers of Richard Montague. Edited and with an introduction by Richmond H.
Every scientist is in his debt. He established a library in the Lyceum which aided in the production of many of his hundreds of books. Mehr ansehen. Das Organon besteht aus sechs Einzelschriften, die vermutlich nicht von Aristoteles selbst, sondern von byzantinischen Gelehrten, die der Sammlung auch den Namen gaben, in dieser Form zusammengestellt worden sind. Peri hermeneias: Ausgabe 3. Jahrhundert v. Aristoteles bestimmte den Gegenstand wie folgt: "Es gibt eine Wissenschaft, welche das Seiende als Seiendes untersucht und das demselben an sich Zukommende.
Biologische Schriften. Mehr erfahren Sie hier. Nikomachische Ethik: Reclams Universal-Bibliothek. Und wie wird man ein guter Mensch? Die wichtigsten davon sind: Raum, Zeit, Bewegung und Ursache. Nikomachische Ethik. According to his reading, the traditional logic, contrary to the most popular interpretation, consisted of theorems s and rules, and not exclusively of the latter. The logic of assertoric sentences has the following form. Let the formulas lower-case letters are term variables Uab, Iab, Yab, Oab stand for the sentences «every a is b », «no a is b », «some a are b », «some a are not b », respectively.
This machinery is sufficient for proving all valid modes of syllogistic and direct inference. However, it does not provide a decision procedure. However, this was not a complete solution, because some inconclusive forms remained not rejected on this basis. The rule roughly speaking is as follows: if the implications Cxz and Cyz are rejected, then the implication Ckxyz is also rejectable, where the letters x an y stand for Yab or Oab, but z represents Uab, Iab, Ya, Oab or an implication formed from such formulas or their conjunctions.
There are attempts to introduce empty and singular terms some examples given by Aristotle himself and especially by the Schoolmen suggest that the latter should be admitted; the empty terms are much more difficult matter. Other interpretations consider traditional logic as a system of natural deduction Still another attempt see it as a part of predicate logic or the theory of classes Let me list some of works in the chronological order:.
He showed that the whole traditional logic could be embedded into predicate logic, assuming the existence of at least three objects. He offered an analysis not a full reconstruction of traditional logic in terms of mathematical logic. In particular, he interpreted categorical sentences as combinations of atomic formulas of predicate logic. The book contains an extensive study of the deductive methodology in Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas In general, they accepted the so-called classical theory of truth this label was probably invented in Poland going back to Aristotle.
In his Metaphysics, we find two basic passages concerning truth:. Veritas est adequatio intellectus et rei, secundum quod intellectus dicit esse quod est vel non esse quod non est. The definition given in Metaphysics b was not accepted, because it was based on the allogenic theory of judgment. This line of thought was continued by his students, who considered the idea of correspondence between truth-bearers and the world.
Let us therefore pass to the classical doctrine and ask what is understood by «accordance with reality». The point is not that a true thought should be a good copy or simile of the thing of which we are thinking, as a painted copy or a photograph is. A brief reflection suffices to recognize the metaphorical nature of such a comparison.
We shall confine ourselves to the following: «John thinks truly if and only if John thinks that things are so and so, and things in fact are so and so. Even if the word «correspondence» was used, it was considered as a convenient abbreviation, but not as expressing a genuine relation. Tarski always stressed his link with Aristotle. The following quotation is particularly clear in this respect:.
If we wished to adapt ourselves to modern philosophical terminology, we could perhaps express this conception by means of the familiar formula: The truth of a sentence consists in its agreement with or correspondence to rea- lity. For a theory of truth which is to be based upon the later formulation the term «correspondence theory of truth» has been suggested.
It is up to us to look for a more precise expression of our intuitions. He understood it as investigations concerning the effectiveness of actions. He proposed a complete system of logic as the foundation of all thinking activity. The calculus of names was its second part. It is a theory of the logical constant «is». An interesting remark about the philosophy behind this system was made by Kotarbinski:. Let it be added that Lesniewski called his system ontology, in conformity with certain terms already used.
It must [ This was also documented by a plan of translating of all of his works into Polish. This project was sponsored by the Polish Academy of Science and Letters. World War II prevented the executions of this ambitious project; only the Politics was published. Many Polish philosophers accepted various particular Aristotelian-like views. However, it would be incorrect to say that we had to do with a Polish Aristotelianism. It was rather the case that an adherence to a tradition in philosophy originated with Aristotle and saw a deep link between logic and philosophy.
An important novelty consisted in linking this tradition with philosophy strongly inspired by mathematical logic, although the Stagirite was also a logical philosopher, of course, of his times. When Vilna University was founded; thus, advanced Polish intellectual life can be strongly identified with that of Cracow, at least to the end of 16th century; in fact, Cracow played a dominant role until the turn of 19th and 20th centuries.
Wasik, Sebastian Petrycy z Pilzna i jego epoka. Bethge, ; H. Twardowski, On Content and Object of Presentations, tr. Grossmann, The Hague, Wojtasiewicz in J. It was translated into English by V. Barnes, M. Schofield and R. Sorabji eds. Metaphysics, London, Duckworth, , p. Skarica eds. Priest and R. Priest, R.
Routley and J. Norman eds. Rosser and A. Haack, Deviant Logic. Fuzzy Logic. See also discussionjs in A. Menne and N. Simons and J. Wolenski with comments by the translators , History and Philosophy of Logic 8 , p. Hiz in S. McCall ed.
However, this statement is not correct. On the contrary, this issue is not considered in this book at all. Certainly, he considered his On the Principle of Contradiction in Aristotle to be more philosophical than logical. On the other hand, the mentioned fact that he began to translated this book into English could suggest that he recognized its value. Heinrich Scholz qualified this paper as the most interesting twenty pages written about the history of logic.
See discussions in S. Thom, The Logic of Essentialism. Kneale and M. Corcoran ed. Other works a selection : I. However, one can guess that his work at least created a climate for a considerable interest in the Stagirite. This concerns elementary textbooks used in secondary schools as well as more advanced ones written for students of universities.
Wojtasiewicz, Gnosiology. Kotarbinski, Praxiology. An Introduction to the Science of Efficient Action, tr. Wojtasiewicz, Oxford, Pergamon Press, Kotarbinski, Gnosiology , p. Barnett in St. Lesniewski, Collected Works , Dordrecht, Kluwer, , p. Check if your institution has already acquired this book: authentification to OpenEdition Freemium for Books. You can suggest to your institution to acquire one or more ebooks published on OpenEdition Books. Do not hesitate to give them our contact information: OpenEdition - Freemium Department access openedition.
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Presses universitaires du Septentrion. L'Aristote logique. Search inside the book. Table of contents. Cite Share. Cited by. Text Notes Author. Full text. When Vilna University was foun Ze studiow nad dziejami Bonitz, « Grossmann, The Hague, Turquette, Man He mentioned it rather occasionally, lik However, one can g Kotarbinski, Elementy teorii poznania, logiki formalnej i metodologii nauk Elements of the The Notes 1 The University of Cracow was the only Polish university until Author Jan Wolenski.
By the same author Reply to Prof. Read Open Access. Freemium Recommend to your library for acquisition. ISBN: Wolenski, J. The Reception of Aristotle in Poland around In Thouard, D. Villeneuve d'Ascq: Presses universitaires du Septentrion. Wolenski, Jan. Thouard, Denis. Villeneuve d'Ascq: Presses universitaires du Septentrion, New edition [online]. Thouard, D. Thouard, Denis, ed. Your e-mail has be sent.
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